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Both domestically and internationally, counter terrorism policy is a crucial and universal 
challenge of countries in the modern era. Where do countries generate their counter terrorism 
policy and how does it change after terrorist attacks? Using Policy Convergence Theory (PCT), 
this paper attempts to explore how counter terrorism policy changes and is adopted after a large-
scale attack. PCT argues that governments of a similar economic track will ultimately create 
similar policies in all policy genres, but this theory has not been examined in light of the threat of 
terrorism. This paper’s objective is to evaluate the role and existence of PCT in counterterrorism 
policy. Using original research of case studies of Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, India, and France, I find positive evidence that policy convergence is present in nearly 
all cases of response to major terrorist attacks.  
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Introduction      
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 brought substantial changes to states’ 
counterterrorism policy across the globe. In the international community, the United States is 
regarded as militarily strong, and when the US was attacked, that shook up the world. Citizens in 
the United States became more patriotic, people donated extra blood, and towns sent their 
emergency services to help in New York City. The United States responded with a military 
presence in Afghanistan the following month, a year later, passed the Patriot Act, which 
increased the legality of surveillance on US citizens, and the government made immigration 
regulations stricter. The international community had mixed reactions, but the main allies of the 
United States expressed condolences.  
One of the most symbolic reactions was when NATO declared that the attack on the US 
was an attack on all of their members. The first potential policy output across nations occurred 
on September 12, when the UN Security Council made various resolutions to combat the efforts 
of terrorism.  However, these statements of solidarity did not give the United States a green light 
for offensive action. In all, 30 nations pledged military assistance to the United States in 
combatting the culprits. The countries pledging support and sending condolences realized that 
there was a balancing act to manage. These inclinations towards greater counterterrorism policies 
affirm the idea that during times when terrorism strikes, governments end up creating similar 
policy responses.   
There are many different factors as to why countries create specific policies. One of the 
most important, and almost obvious, factors that influences policy creation is the type of country 
being examined. Within the specific type of regime, there are different mechanisms for which 
polices are created, such as whether a state has a democracy or authoritarian leader, whether the 
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democracy has a presidential or parliamentary government, or whether or not the state has a 
unitary or federal system. All of these characteristics allow legislation to be created and 
ultimately decides what types of policies are enacted.  
The question I would like to examine is what determines policy adoption after a large-
scale attack? An answer to this question could be Policy Convergence Theory. Policy 
Convergence Theory proposes that as various societies obtain more industrialized infrastructure, 
industrialized nations tend to take on the same qualities through their policy outputs. The answer 
could be that the one common policy response is the most effective at combatting terrorism. An 
additional answer to the question could be that the United States has a large influence in the 
security policies states put in place. The field of security policy could stand to benefit from an 
examination of why policy outputs look similar in the realm of counterterrorism policy.  
In this paper, I will first give background on the history of terrorism, counterterrorism 
policy responses, and Policy Convergence Theory. Then, I will examine the literature in the 
fields of Policy Convergence Theory, Counterterrorism Policy, and Regime Type and Policy 
Outputs. After the literature review, I will provide theoretical reasoning behind my argument. 
After that, I will elaborate on the case study methodology used for the study, I will then run 
analysis on my findings, and finally, present my conclusions.  
History and Background 
Terrorism has been seen in many different forms throughout history and its definition is 
always changing. Terrorism has its roots from the French Revolution and this form of the word 
came from the government-inflicted terrorism upon its citizens. In the 19th century, terrorism 
began to morph into the structure we are familiar with today; its source comes from non-
governmental actors. At this time, terrorist activity occurred through assassination of key leaders. 
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After World War II, terrorism transformed into groups putting pressure “on the colonial powers 
(such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands) to hasten their withdrawal.” The second way 
terrorism changed was to “intimidate the indigenous population into supporting a particular 
group’s claims to leadership of the emerging post-colonial state,” (Roberts 2002). As time 
progressed, killing civilians became the norm for terrorist groups.  
The first point of justification by terrorists for violence against civilians relates back to 
when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza. However, the use of violence was still state-
related, which dates back to the French Revolution. In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda came into fruition 
after they helped Afghanistan rid of the Soviet Union; they developed the desire to rid of all 
Western influence (Roberts 2002). This group has never been connected to any sovereign nation; 
they were fighting a fight of ideals.  
Terrorism can be defined by the US State Department’s definition. International 
Terrorism is found in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d)(2) and states: 
"Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents" (U.S. Department of State 2012). However, one could 
say that terrorism is in the eye of the beholder because one person’s terror is another person’s 
freedom fight. Terrorism, at its core, tries to eat away at the essence of a state’s culture and 
national identity and replace it with fear and distrust in the hopes of making a political statement 
or change. Once attacked, people and governments are vulnerable, which leads their 
governments to make policy decisions that may play into the fear of terrorism- such as imposing 
strict standards on Muslim populations.  
Counterterrorism policy has been on leader’s minds since the 1970s. Various presidents 
since the 1970s argued that terrorism is something they would like to fight, but then once they 
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reached office, there was little getting done on the topic. It was not until the U.S.A. Patriot Act 
where those ideas were implemented (Crenshaw 2005). Additionally, one scholar argues that 
each President’s concern with setting a new agenda from the previous administration may have 
hindered the counterterrorism efforts of the United States (Naftali 2005). This is not to say that 
the US government did not respond to any terrorist, but the responses were not consistent.  
Security policy faces difficulties because as a government starts to figure out how to 
combat a specific action, terrorists advanced their attacks to where they cannot be circumvented.  
There is a balancing act a state must weigh when deciding what to do, especially if they are a 
democracy. In terms of recent terrorism, i.e. after September 11th, states have struggled with the 
notion of balancing freedom and protection, such as the U.S.A. Patriot Act.  
Security policy ultimately focuses on how people respond to terrorism: security is high 
and governments of attacked nations try to find the best solution to combat the problem. States 
who have been attacked try to implement responses and other states try to prevent a similar 
attack from happening on their soil. The unifying factor of terrorism is the culprits, which may 
lead to unifying, or converging policy responses. Since September 11th, many states created 
policy responses that are similar in nature. Policy Convergence Theory may be able to shed light 
as to why counterterrorism policies appear to be similar. 
Policy Convergence Theory is a public policy theory that is most visible when 
industrialized societies grow in a similar fashion. Post-industrialization era is the time when 
policy convergence is most visible. The theory of policy convergence proposes that as various 
societies obtain more industrialized infrastructure, industrialized nations tend to take on the same 
qualities. This theory, combined with the current globalization trends, is suggestive of more 
cohesive policy across state lines. Therefore, Policy Convergence Theory combines the 
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economic pathway of a state, the policies created by a state, and compares states within in a 
similar economic condition cohort.  
Policy Convergence Theory is usually used within the realm of domestic policy, for a 
specific country to compare to another. However, Policy Convergence Theory can be used as a 
general principle to evaluate the security policies of multiple countries at one time. While it is 
tempting to think that each case of terrorism is unrelated, convergence theory allows political 
scientists to think about a unifying theory for all of the responses to terrorism. Analysis of 
security policy could benefit from the use of this theoretical perspective; furthermore, otherwise 
two relatively distant fields, security policy analysis and public policy, may speak to each other 
within counterterrorism response research.  
Why and How of Policy Convergence Theory 
 Policy convergence can take many forms. However, Bennett (1991) argues that policy 
convergence most often has common structural and procedural variables of creating similar 
policies. Bennett stresses the importance of recognizing that even if states create similar policies, 
the problems could be of a different nature, but the structure and the intension for creating those 
solutions could be similar. For example, when the US Safety and Health Administration was 
creating a standard of exposure to vinyl chloride gas, it had an impact on the Swedish 
government’s decision to regulate in a similar fashion (Bennett 1991, 222).  Furthermore, 
globalization and resulting policy convergence makes the policy of a specific state less 
autonomous, especially in the cases of labor and environmental standards. Having policies 
converge on the idea that seemingly universal regulations of the environment and labor may 
create more problems for one country over another, but they feel inclined to accept the 
conditions because of international pressure (Drezner 2001). Less autonomous policy indicates 
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various problems resulting in a specific state when they recognize that policy is growing to 
become more globalized and convergent.  
There are various reasons policies converge. According to Holzinger and Knill (2005), 
imposition from a non-governmental organization, international harmonization, regulatory 
competition, transnational communication, and independent problem solving are reasons for 
state’s policies to converge with another’s. Most significantly, the fact that countries 
independently solve problems and create similar policies––just as people open their umbrellas at 
the same time when it rains––illustrates the scope of policy convergence. It has been argued that 
economic policy is most discussed in policy convergence theory and responses to topics other 
than economics are similar only to societal peers (Thomas 1980). Policy Convergence Theory 
can explain more than just issues or similar policies within the field of economics; thus, it should 
be applied to different types of studies. Security Policy could benefit from the scope of this 
theory.  
Policy diffusion is a common term in the study of policy convergence. Policy diffusion is 
when policy made in one state is influenced by the policy choices of a different state. Diffusion 
drives policy convergence (Knill 2005). It is then assumed that policy is not created in a vacuum, 
but rather from affiliations and communication across state lines (Simmons, et al 2004). In some 
areas of policy, it is evident that nations converge with uniform ideas. In the United States and 
Europe, it has been discovered that nations came to the same degree of regulation of toxins 
(Cartwright 1986). The fact that some states share regulatory standards signifies that policy 
convergence is a possible outcome. Arguably, international organizations help facilitate policy 
convergence, because member states adhere to the guidelines laid out by the organization. 
However, the policy convergence within Europe is not EU sanctioned, but rather, European 
	 	 Allebach
   
7	
nations’ interests, legitimacy, and coherence of the nation’s policies shape their policy 
convergence (Barbé et al 2009). Policy convergence is a viable theory and can shed light on the 
comparable counterterrorism policy across similar states. 
Counterterrorism and Policy Convergence Theory 
Direct security threats are an important aspect of foreign policy. The responses those 
issues receive generally determine how the public views the current government in office. The 
nation can reach a consensus and the leaders can receive higher approval ratings if an issue 
brought to light regards direct security threats (Knecht and Weatherford 2006). After 9/11, states 
around the world were forced to revisit their security measures, and counterterrorism policies. 
For instance, in Britain, the government was forced to respond strongly to the counterterrorism 
measures, and at the same time, domestically, convince their public that the only option they had 
was to create tough laws (Kostakopoulou 2008). Additionally, the type of democratic system 
may affect the way foreign policy is created. In parliamentary systems, often times the leading 
party follows the executive policy suggestions, however that is not always the case. The more 
controversial the topic, the more likely a parliament may vote against the executive –especially if 
there is not a consensus. This alters the decision making authority and its’ dynamics, places a 
great emphasis on high politics, and allows for the public to have influence on foreign policy 
(Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010). This type of thinking creates an environment best suited for the 
creation of counterterrorism policy.  
Counterterrorism measures most often are bureaucratic efforts to circumvent terrorist 
threats and attacks. States can have specific bureaucratic responses to any policy issue, and 
counterterrorism can be personalized to one state or have influence over many others. September 
11th, 2001 marked the beginning of the strongest counterterrorism efforts in the United States, 
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followed shortly after by European states. It was common to see policy that favored solving 
emergency situations than maintaining individual’s rights. There was a shift in the general 
national role conception of Europe during deliberation on counterterrorism policy. Democracy 
was still to be associated with freedom, but that freedom must come with responsibility and costs 
(Tsoukala 2004). Paring freedom and responsibility together allowed for legislation that may be 
prejudicial against foreigners and minorities.  
Governments trying to combat radical Islamic terrorism, often discriminate against 
Muslim citizens. Despite the fact that European countries have laws that protect the Muslim 
identity in Europe, when it comes to counterterrorism policy, there is not set stance on how to 
help the European Muslims who are negatively affected by such policies (Ahmed 2011). There 
are similarly prejudiced policies in the United States and Australia (Cainkar 2005). However, 
Europe’s policy is not as strong as the United States because they have a greater focus in 
maintaining the integrity of their international organizations (Bures 2013).  
Although industrialized nations may be creating substantial and detailed counterterrorism 
policies, countries like India are still working out how to adopt the global counterterrorism 
strategies (Puroshotham and Prasad 2009). The major discrepancy of counterterrorism policy, in 
India for example, is that policy makers much reconcile the differences between global and local 
norms (Romaniuk 2007). In most cases, it is safer for politicians to side with their local public 
opinions to maintain positive relations in their home countries, except for in the period of time 
after a nation is attacked; specifically regarding terrorist attacks in India.  
Regime Type and Policy Outputs 
As stated previously, there are many components as to how policy is created, including 
the regime type of a state. A regime is the type of government a country has and this can be 
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authoritarian or democracy. Within each realm, there is a spectrum of openness each can regime 
type can take on. This spectrum of opening will affect the ways policy is created and 
implemented. Each regime type will have different mechanisms of policy creation and the 
respective outputs. Multiple variables can influence how regime type affects policy outputs, 
including leadership personality. There is evidence that within a crisis, the democracies that are 
lead by individuals that value their government’s restraints will create more peace-focuses policy 
responses. Furthermore, there is also evidence that democracies led by those that challenge their 
government’s restraints and authoritarian regimes led by both types of people will create more 
aggressive policy responses to crisis situations (Keller 2005). Therefore, regime type affects 
policy outputs.  
Beyond leadership personality, scholars may argue that regime type could determine the 
type of signaling techniques a country may use in their foreign policy intentions. Scholars tend to 
favor democracies’ abilities to signal better because of democracies’ inherent nature to appeal to 
a general audience. However, empirical data affirms that democracies do not have signaling 
advantages of authoritarian governments (Weeks 2008). This is significant because if a state’s 
culture and customs have an impact on the types of policies a state may try and implement, the 
signaling power could be intermingled in a state’s culture. Furthermore, as states may vary in 
signaling power, some regime types vary in the extent they report economic growth figures. 
Different types of governments may have different motivations when reporting economic data. 
Authoritative governments have greater tendencies to overstate their GDP growth rates (Magee 
et al 2015). This is significant because the overstatement of economic figures exemplifies the 
varying nature of policy outputs within a single genre of policy within a specific regime type.  
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Terrorism research and regime type have seen an increase in research since 9/11. One 
study concludes that the tenure of democratic leaders depends on increased levels of peace, while 
authoritarian leaders are not as effected by times of conflict (Debs et al 2010).  Beyond that, the 
literature disagrees on the relationship between democracies and terrorism. Some scholars argue 
that regime type does not have a correlation with suicide terrorism (Wade et al 2007). However, 
not all scholars agree. Some scholars have affirmed through statistical analysis that established 
democracies are “less likely to experience terrorism than non-democracies.” However, newly 
formed democracies are the most likely regime type to experience terrorism (Eyerman 1998). It 
is important to note that the argument of Wade et al applies only to suicide terrorism. 
Additionally, it is necessary to note that Eyerman’s conclusions come before 9/11. The 
ramifications of the timing of this study may lead to the research’s applicability to this literature 
review.  
On the other side of the argument, some scholars would assert that terrorist attacks occur 
most often in stable democracies (Eubank et al 2001). Furthermore, an additional regime type 
and terrorism research study took a different approach. It is argued that states that “exhibit a 
certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of regime type, are likely,” to experience more 
transnational terrorism. Scholars argue that the more active a state is in the realm of foreign 
policy that relates to a specific terrorist group, that the state would be more likely to experience 
terrorism (Savun et al 2009). Essentially, these scholars argue that regime type does not play a 
huge role in deciding how terrorism affects countries. One could argue, then, that regime type 
does not influence the associated counterterrorism responses that come out of those attacks. 
Understanding the spectrum regime types can fall on is important to understanding potential 
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counterterrorism policy responses. It is also important to realize that the literature is conflicting 
on this topic.  
Theory 
 Policy Convergence Theory is the idea that states with similar economic situations will 
create similar policies for various topics. This theory is highly contested because of claims that 
the policy convergence only occurs in a topical form. For example, all developed nations have 
some sort of welfare policy, but the nature of that policy varies from state to state. In terms of 
security policy, specifically counterterrorism measures taken after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11th, 2001, policy convergence theory is applicable to this type of policy. After 9/11, 
states created or utilized policies that were most often similar. These policies converged further 
after each individual state had their own unfortunate terrorist attacks.  
Economics cannot completely answer the question as to why states respond in a specific 
nature and why governments create the specific polices that they do. An additional perspective as 
to why counterterrorism policies look similar is the notion of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion is 
the idea that policy choices made in one government are influenced by policies created in 
another government. The difference between diffusion and Policy Convergence Theory is that 
diffusion is not based on any economic track and is not path dependent. This makes diffusion 
difficult to track, however, Policy Convergence Theory is difficult to trace, but in a different 
way. Policy Convergence Theory deals with like economies, and the similar economies focused 
on in this study all have strong relationships with the United States.  
The influence of the United States is distinctly apparent in security policy because the 
United States spends the most money on the military, and thus, is the strongest regulator of 
security. It would be remiss to not discuss how the United State’s response to 9/11 could have 
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influenced the other policy responses. It is not ethnocentric to consider the United States 
influence because before September 11th, terrorism was different. The United States was forced 
to act as a leader in combatting this newer type of terrorism because the world demanded a 
stronger response and this was achieved through the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The 
UN Security Council agreed on Security Council Resolution 1373, which called on states to 
freeze terrorist financing, pass anti-terrorism laws, stop suspected terrorists from traveling across 
state borders, and the resolution ordered that all asylum seekers be screened for terrorist ties in 
their country of origin. This resolution is significant because it required, as it was international 
law, that states revisit their domestic policies so that they match an international standard. The 
United State’s influence in this resolution is apparent, as it was ratified on September 28, 2001 
(United Nations 2001). The proximity to 9/11 is indisputable, and demonstrates that the 
happenings of the US matter to international affairs. Therefore, the responses to these cases did 
not happen in a vacuum and it is necessary to recognize the United State’s influence in this 
discussion.  
Therefore, Policy Convergence Theory is still helpful and applicable, but it needs to be 
adapted to account for the nature of 9/11 and be analyzed with the fact that the people creating 
the counterterrorism policies do not live in a vacuum. Even if a state’s counterterrorism policy 
responses are converging due to the United State’s influence, the policies are still converging and 
that is an important phenomenon in security policy. I anticipate that policy convergence will 
occur between states that experience large-scale attacks. The convergence occurs within the 
specific counterterrorism policies created by states and any bureaucratic responses that came 
after a large-scale attack. Convergence may also be a time frame in which the policies are 
created and if the policies target a specific group of people. Non-convergence could occur if a 
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state simply creates a policy response after a terrorist attack. The responses need to be 
comparable between multiple states that are similar in nature. Policy Convergence helps political 
scientists understand the response to terrorism, operating in a similar era, with similar resources, 
similar technology, similar threat, and it is expected that the content of the policies can be tied 
together across state lines. 
Therefore, my hypothesis is that since 9/11, the security and defense policies of 
developed countries are replicated by other states when a state experiences a large-scale terrorist 
attack. To test my hypothesis, I will examine the response to terrorism in Indonesia, Turkey, 
Spain, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, and France. Through these cases, I will examine their 
specific policy responses, which may ultimately lead to policy convergence in their post 9/11 
security policies.  
Methodology 
These countries were analyzed through case studies. The following cases have been 
selected: 2002 Bali Bombings, 2003 Istanbul Bombings, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, 2004 
Beslan (Russia) School Siege, 7 July 2005 London Bombings, 2008 Mumbai Attacks and the 
November 2015 Paris Attacks. Multiple variables have gone into the selection of the cases. It is 
important to consider the type of terrorist attack, as citizens and legislators may respond 
differently to a school siege than to a train bombing. The terrorist organization responsible may 
also affect the policy response to the attack. Additionally, the regime type of the country and the 
type of government a country has may influence the counterterrorism legislation created. Also, 
the culture of the country may play a significant role into the policy response because different 
countries have different values, and that can easily transcend into the policy responses. Lastly, an 
additional variable to consider is whether or not states have had counterterrorism laws written 
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into their legal code before the large-scale attack that prompts a new policy response. This 
counterterrorism legislation could be for domestic terrorism or international terrorism. Having a 
culture of counterterrorism already established could determine the extent of a response a 
country can legally produce or that its’ citizens demand.  
Each of the terrorist attacks will be analyzed in a similar fashion. First, there will be a 
short summary of the terrorist attack. Then, the methodology includes a discussion of the state’s 
previous terrorism encounters before their respective 9/11’s is required. Next, the specific 
counterterrorism policy response to the large-scale attack, if any, will be described. Specific 
policy responses are classified as actual legislation produced by each state, bureaucratic 
responses, such as creating a new department of Homeland Security, criminal code or police 
force utilization, or military response. Lastly, each case will have some conclusions drawn about 
how their counterterrorism policy responses fit in with their state’s personal history and how they 
compare to the United States’ policy responses to 9/11. After each case has been examined, then 
more analysis will occur to compare all the case studies in one cohort. The relationship, 
similarities, and dissimilarity between the cases will help determine if the policy responses of 
states that experience a large-scale attack converge. 
2002 Bali Bombings 
Indonesia is the world’s third most populous democracy, with a population of 
258,316,051 people. It is the largest Muslim-majority state in the world, where it is not an 
official religion, with 87.2% of the population subscribing to the religion. Indonesia is a 
presidential republic with proportional representation. Indonesia has the largest economy in 
Southeast Asia, with a GDP (PPP) of $2.842 trillion (“The World Factbook: Indonesia). This 
background sheds light on how Indonesia fits in with the other case studies. 
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The October 12, 2002 Bali Bombings were an Islamic terrorist attack on a tourist town in 
Indonesia; three bombs were detonated in this attack. One bomb was detonated through suicide 
bomb at an Irish Pub, most frequented by tourists; one suicide bomb went off at a nearby 
nightclub; and another bomb was detonated in front of the U.S. consulate. 202 people were killed 
from 21 countries including 88 from Australia, 38 from Indonesia, and 28 from the United 
Kingdom. The group responsible for the attack was Jemaah Islamiyah, and they chose these 
locations and soft targets because they wanted to focus on attacking westerners, thus, continuing 
the holy war against the United States and the West (“The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot” 
2012). The intention of this group was to have this attack occur on the anniversary of September 
11th, but their plans were delayed.  
Indonesia has had an extremely long history with terrorism in its’ borders with the Free 
Aceh Movement, occurring on the island of Sumatra. This group is involved with a separatist 
conflict because the group wanting a more radical view of Islam, versus what the government 
promotes. The group is known for its guerilla warfare and its actions have killed approximately 
15,000 lives since its creation in 1976. In 2005, the government negotiated with the Movement 
and gave the Movement more autonomy in the region to enact Sharia law, as long as both sides 
scaled back their military capacity (Hynes 2016). Since this region is the only region in 
Indonesia that promotes Sharia law, the region has become a point of meeting for Jihadi groups, 
however the Indonesian government has been working to prevent such occurrences.  
Beside the domestic terrorism, the terrorism Indonesia encounters has been 
predominately Islamic terrorism. The earliest attack that has been most notably Islamic occurred 
in the late 1980s. Additionally, Mochammad Achwan, leader of Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid 
(JAT), was responsible for an attack in 1985. The UN later, in 2011, added Mochammad 
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Achwan to a list for being associated with Al-Qaeda (“Mochammad Achwan” 2012). 
Additionally, Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah were responsible for the 2000 Christmas Eve 
attacks on Christians within Indonesia (Hynes 2016). These key early attacks were the start of 
Al-Qaeda’s influence and turmoil within the nation.  
Indonesia has worked with a strategy to combat terrorism within its’ borders. First, it 
utilizes their criminal code and law enforcement tactics. Police in Indonesia try to combat 
terrorism within the realm of their legal code. Second, Indonesian counterterrorism utilizes their 
military for intelligence gathering. The military is also used to combat radicalization in conflict 
areas. Third, the Indonesian government works to eliminate the causes of terrorism with the 
intention to disengage terrorists from future terroristic activity and upset the radicalization 
process within Indonesia (Gindarsah 2014). These tactics are primarily bureaucratic efforts that 
reflect the Indonesian system of government.  
The main piece of policy that came out of the Bali Bombings was Indonesia’s Anti-
terrorism Law (ATL) of 2002. This bill was signed into law six days after the Bali bombings, 
signifying the effect the attack had on the nation. The ATL fills in the missing pieces of 
Indonesia’s criminal code that does not necessarily account for modern terrorism. The ATL 
allows for easier investigation, conviction, and penalty for terrorists. The ATL also eats away at 
the states due process rules, signifying that counterterrorism trumps normal crime (Butt 2008) 
(US Department of State 2016). This piece of legislation passed through the system because 
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2003 Istanbul Bombings 
On November 20, 2003 27 people were killed and over 400 were injured in the Istanbul 
Bombings. Terrorists from Al Qaeda were responsible for blowing up the British consulate and 
popular London-based bank, HSBC through the use of suicide bomb. Reports indicate that the 
blasts were so strong at the consulate that neighboring building’s windows were blown out 
(“Istanbul Rocked by Double Bombing,” 2003). This was attack primarily against Turkey, but 
the intention with bombing British-based entities indicates the focus on harming Western ideals.  
Turkey has battled with domestic terrorism for a long time. The Revolutionary People’s 
Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was created in 1994 is anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkey 
establishment. In 2003, DHKP/C increased its attacks in Turkey, most likely because of its 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (“Turkish Domestic Terrorism” 2016). The most notable 
example of domestic terrorism within Turkey is the Kurdistan People’s Congress (PKK). This is 
a separatist group based in Southern Turkey and Northern Iraq. In 1984, PKK called for an 
independent Kurdish state (“Profile: Kuridstan Workers’ Party,” 2015). PKK has been involved 
in armed violence, including the killing of Turkish troops and kidnapping of Turkish leaders. 
Often times, countries recognize terrorist groups and include them in their watch lists. The PKK 
has mixed recognition as a terrorist organization; the UN has not designated the group as a 
terrorist organization, neither has Russia, Israel, or the People’s Republic of China (“Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) Narrative,” 2015). With these facts in mind, the government and Turkey 
as a whole are used to the idea of terrorism and what that entails. 
In 2002, Turkey made bureaucratic efforts to utilize their police force in arresting 
members of Al Qaeda (U.S. Department of State 2003). In 2003, Turkey supported the United 
State’s Operation Enduring Freedom. They also signed and ratified all 12 of the international 
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agreements on combatting terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2004). In 2005, the Turkish 
government started the trials of the Istanbul bombers, who asserted that Turkey would continue 
to be recipients of terrorist attacks if they continued coordinating efforts with Western 
governments, specifically the United States. In 2005 and 2006, the Turkish National Police and 
the National Intelligence Organization had a very strong counterterrorism campaign that that was 
aggressive in detaining individuals involved in terror and intervened before terrorist activity 
could be carried out (U.S. Department of State 2006). Additionally, in 2005, Turkey was 
working with the international community in strengthening its definition of terrorism, so that it 
coincided with other states’ (U.S. Department of State 2005). However, in 2006, a change of 
definition did not occur when Turkey made various amendments to its antiterrorism legal code 
(U.S. Department of State 2006). In 2005, Turkey submitted legislation to its parliament 
regarding the criminalization of terrorist financing. This action was completed in 2006, through 
the reorganization of Turkey’s Financial Intelligence Unit (MASAK). The bureaucratic agency 
specific acted against those that illegally financed terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2006).  In 
all, Turkey provided bureaucratic and legislative responses to the 2003 Istanbul attacks.  
2004 Madrid Train Bombings 
On March 11, 2004, Al Qaeda attacked Spain through their train system. 191 people died 
and over 1800 people were injured. In the attack, bombs were used as the main weapon. There 
were many arrests made, and under Spanish law, most spend up to forty years in prison (Spain 
Train Bombings Fast Facts 2016). Spain has been used to conflict for years.  
Spain has experienced an armed conflict since the late 1950s, known as the Spain-ETA 
Conflict. The Basques are a group of people that have wanted freedom. Spain has given the 
Basque country a lot of autonomy, including a police force and parliament. However, the ETA 
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desires full independence (What is ETA 2011). The ETA is group of violent separatists, which 
are referred to as terrorists by many countries, including Spain, the United States, Britain, and 
France.  The ETA focused their violence on Spain’s government leaders. These actions created a 
lot of controversy and negative sentiment within the culture of Spain. In the wake of the 2004 
train bombings, the government was so used to experiencing violence from the ETA, that they 
were the first group blamed for the attacks, before the authorities learned it was a Moroccan-
based Al Qaeda attack.  
 Spain had counterterrorism legislation before this attack occurred, however, after 9/11, 
there was a policy response made. Domestically, a Law on Political Parties (2002) was created to 
outlaw political parties that violated tenets of the constitution by engaging in terroristic activities 
(Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain 2003). This was a response to the growing levels of 
terrorism throughout the world after the events of 9/11. One of the biggest Spanish 
counterterrorism measures occurred in the creation of Law 12/2003, which subjected the 
prevention and freezing of terrorist financing. King Carlos expressly wrote that this was a direct 
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Spain’s general criminal penal code has a definition of terrorism; although it is most 
applicable to the domestic terrorist attacks they face from the ETA, it is still applicable when 
international terrorism enters Spain’s borders. Before 9/11, Spain already had strict anti-
terrorism laws, similar to the Patriot Act; these laws are so strict that Human Rights Watch and 
the UN had outlined their concern over Spain’s policies. The fact that Spain did not have an 
explicit response to the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid could mean that “1) the existing 
legislation was felt to be sufficient; 2) Spain did not want to be perceived as pursuing Islamic 
terrorists; 3) Spanish authorities thought that the criminal law model is appropriate for 
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countering terrorism and therefore no special legislation was needed,” (Guido 2005). Although 
the Spanish government did not create new policy because their already enacted policy was 
seemingly proficient, there were still responses that demonstrated that Spain did not approve of 
the terrorist actions on their soil. 
2004 Beslan (Russia) School Siege 
On September 1, 2004, 32 radical Islamic Chechen rebels took over 1200 people hostage 
in a local school gymnasium. They held the hostages for three days and ended up killing 330 
people. 186 of those deaths were children and over 700 people were injured (CNN Library, 
2016) (Dougherty 2004). The armed rebels had suicide bombs strapped to their bodies, lined the 
gymnasium with bombs, and would also shoot hostages. On the third day the terrorists detonated 
the bombs, where the large majority of people were killed. Only one of the terrorists survived 
and he was sentenced to life in prison. This was one of the bleakest terrorist attacks Russia has 
ever faced. 
The main group that has been terrorizing Russia within its own borders is the Chechen 
rebels, the group that conducted the Beslan School Siege. The Chechens have wanted 
independence from Russia since the end of the Soviet Union. The Russian government and the 
Chechens have responded to one another with war twice, and there is a current insurgency of the 
Russia Army in Chechnya. There are different groups of terrorists operating in Chechnya 
currently. According to the US Department of State, “the Islamic International Peacekeeping 
Brigade (IIPB) is the primary channel for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerillas, in part 
through links to al-Qaeda-related financiers on the Arabian Peninsula,” (Bhattacharji 2010). 
Many experts cannot agree as to whether Chechen rebels could be involved with Al Qaeda, but 
the Russian government definitely believes Al Qaeda backs the rebels.  
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Russia has a history of trying to combat international terrorism. In 2002, Russia made a 
deal with the United States to expand its working relationship for counterterrorism purposes 
(U.S. Department of State 2003). The Beslan School Siege demonstrated that Russia was ill 
equipped to handle terrorism. The Russian government responded by creating Federal Law No. 
35-EZ of 6 March 2006 “On Counteraction to Terrorism.” This law replaced its predecessor 
from 1998. This law gave a detailed definition of terrorism and gave the federal government 
agencies executive control over the local area resources (police, fire, ambulance, etc.) when 
combatting terrorism through the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK). The NAK is 
tasked with coordinating the actions and policies of various government agencies combatting 
terrorism (Sinai 2014). The Russian military was given a substantially greater role in physically 
combatting or preventing of terrorism. In the 1998 law, there were some concessions permitted 
for terrorist, but in the new law, none at all would be granted. Additionally, and most 
controversially, the law gives the government the right to suspend some individual freedoms 
when combatting or investigating a terrorist attack. This also includes the silencing of what is 
normally characterized as free speech, if it has to do with a terrorist organization (Omelicheva 
2012). In all, this law gave the executive a great deal of power. The President of Russia can 
determine how counterterrorism operations occur and the executive ultimately oversees 
counterterrorism measures. 
7 July 2005 London Bombings 
On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured over 700 people while 
using public transportation three of the bombs went off in the Underground system and one 
bomb went off on a double decker bus (July 7 2005 London Bombings Fast Facts 2013). All four 
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of the bombers died and their intentions were to be known as Muslim extremists. Al-Jazeera 
broadcasted a video detailing a connection with the bombers and Al Qaeda.    
The United Kingdom has dealt with domestic terrorism for years; The Troubles, Irish 
conflict, is the most significant example. Domestic terrorism existed in the United Kingdom 
because certain parties in Northern Ireland felt that the government in London discriminated 
against those who were Catholic. The fact that domestic terrorism existed for a long time in the 
UK influenced their culture. Additionally, the United Kingdom has a special relationship with 
the United States in the sense that the United Kingdom is the US’s number one ally. The 
relationship is important when reflecting on the reasoning behind foreign policy outputs of the 
United Kingdom.  
 The special relationship with the United States was especially apparent after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In 2001, The United Kingdom responded to 9/11 by 
creating the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001. This act, signed by the Queen on 
December 14, 2001, expanded government freedom when it came to combatting terrorism (Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001). This is seen as a direct response to the United 
States’ terrorist attacks because in 2000, Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2000. This act 
outlined the counter-terrorism measures that aimed at combating the domestic terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, as well as defining what constituted domestic and international terrorism 
(Mitchell 2011). Then, in 2005, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was created to correct unlawful 
aspects of the 2001 anti-terrorism legislation.  
 The next piece of legislation was a policy response to the July 2005 public transportation 
terrorist attacks.  The Terrorism Act 2006 had many controversial qualities. The first is that the 
time of imprisonment without charge was extended from 14 days to 28 days. Further, the 
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government made the glorification of terrorist activity and associated supplies (such as bombs) 
illegal. The intent behind this law is to deter people from wanting to join in on terrorist activities 
(Q&A: Terrorism Laws 2006). The culture of the United Kingdom impacted these decisions 
greatly because London was physically affected, which ruined the morale of the people. The 
United Kingdom’s domestic terrorism did not affect everyone, unless if one were in Northern 
Ireland. However, once the attacks hit London, the people wanted to see the terrorism addressed. 
Based on the number of policies created, the culture shifted from ambivalent, to that of a deeply 
motivated population that wanted to bring justice to those who deserved it.	
2008 Mumbai Attacks 
On November 26-29, 2008, ten Pakistani men associated with the terror group, Lashkar-
e-Tayyiba, arrived to India by boat and attacked Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station, 
Leopold Café, Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel, Oberoi Trident Hotel, Metro Cinema, Cama 
and Albless Hospital and Nariman House. They did this by splitting up into pairs and taking each 
area. The terrorists killed 164 people, along with nine of the ten gunmen. One gunman survived 
the attacks and was tried and executed in India in November of 2012. The gunmen used 
automatic weapons and grenades in their attacks (Mumbai Terror Attacks Fast Facts, 2015). This 
occurred in the height of terrorist incidents in India.  
 Terrorism in India is not a new topic. Since the 1980s, India has been dealing with the 
Kashmir insurgents who have never been pleased with the Indian government placing limits on 
the ethnic group’s autonomy (Who Are the Kashmir Militants? 2012). India’s northern states 
have seen much more violence than the southern states, due to the northern borders’ proximity to 
other countries and non-state terrorist actors. However, there have been fewer attacks in India’s 
history before September 11th, 2001. The number of international attacks have grown in the post 
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9/11 world, which signals a changing nature of terrorism, too. To fight terrorism, India has a 
Department of Internal Security, the Central Reserve Police Force, The Research and Analysis 
Wing (RAW), and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The Department of Internal Security is within 
the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Central Reserve Police Force deals mainly with northern state 
terrorism; the RAW is the external intelligence-gathering hub; and the IB is India’s internal 
intelligence source. A Joint Intelligence Committee combines and analyses information from the 
RAW, IB, and military, and most often uses the information to combat terrorism within India 
(Eben and Bajoria 2008). Although India is not new to terrorism, their response to the terrorist 
attacks can be varied, based on the nature of the issue. 
 Counterterrorism in India can take on many forms. The most significant criticism of the 
government’s response to terrorism is that the government can abuse their power. There have 
been reports that the Central Reserve Police Force tends to abuse their power in dealing with the 
Kashmir militants. Further, whenever terrorism strikes, India most often focuses their 
investigative measures on the state’s Muslim population, especially as the majority of post 9/11 
attacks are grounded in radicalized interpretations of Islam.  
 India has three main federal laws that outline the illegalities of terrorism. The first law 
was quite general and was implemented in 1963. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 
applied to the whole of India. This act gave government the authority to act on activities that go 
against the sovereignty of India. As terrorism is directed at weakening a state’s integrity and 
sovereignty, this act is the first applicable measure to outlaw terroristic action. In 1985, an anti-
terrorism law as created, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. This act was in 
effect from 1985-95. It was enacted to address the growing violence apparent in Indian 
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communities, however, it was permitted to lapse because of claims that those enforcing the act 
abused its’ power.  
 The third law created that surrounds the topic of terrorism, is the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, 2002 and was a response to 9/11. This law is similar to the US Patriot Act, in the fact that 
the content of the law and the nature of the debate were controversial. It allowed for the 
imprisonment of suspected terrorists, without trial, gave special powers to those investigating 
terrorism cases, and defined key terms surrounding the idea of terrorism (Eben and Bajoria 
2008). This act was repealed in 2004 due to public dismay of the abuse of power this act brought. 
Although the act has been repealed, lawmakers are trying to bring the legislation back because it 
could aid apprehension attempts.  
 The issue with the Mumbai attacks, beyond the number of deaths and the fact that 
people’s lives were negatively affected, is that India has been a vulnerable nation because of its 
size, population, and culture of varying ethnicities. It is an extremely difficult task for a 
government to create legislation that does not infringe on the intricacies of the various religions 
and ethnicities. That is why many Indian legislatures favored the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
because it had some innate safeguards for those accused. For example, defendants had a right to 
remain silent; police should have warned that anything they say could be used against the 
defendants; and police could not use violence to obtain an answer. If police violated these 
guidelines, then they could end up imprisoned (Guiora 2005). India faces many issues on dealing 
with terrorism because of their culture of domestic terrorism and the varied ethnicities and 
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November 2015 Paris Attacks 
On November 13, 2015, Islamic State (ISIS) attacked six locations across Paris, France, 
killing 130 people and injuring hundreds. These locations included a soccer stadium, restaurants, 
and a concert space. The attackers led these attacks with explosive and assault weapons. The 
intention of the killing was to have mass casualties and great visibility (Almasy et al 2015). Both 
Russia and the United States reached out to the French government offering assistance for the 
investigation.  
France’s history and current social policies could be a reason for such strong attacks by 
ISIS and other Islamic groups. The eight-year Algerian war in the 1950-60s created “resentments 
and suspicions on all sides,” (Bleich 2016). After the war, France’s strong economy made it easy 
for North Africans to immigrate to France, but that did not mean the citizens of France accepted 
them. This movement allowed France to have a substantial Muslim population, making it a 
viable European country for ISIS recruitment strategy.  
The current social policies of France could be argued to be a detriment to 
counterterrorism measures. The French promote laïcité, which is a form of extreme secularism 
so that all men and women will appear equal to one another. This can easily anger followers of 
Islam because laïcité stipulates that women cannot wear headscarves for modesty. Most often, 
people believe this enforcement of secularization is to mask Islamophobia, but that is 
speculation. Additionally, the French believe strongly in the notion of being French. This means 
that if one is a migrant or new to the country of France and wants to live there, France will often 
times grant citizenship under the stipulation that the new citizens assimilate. This means that 
French schools are only taught in French, language proficiency is necessary for success, and one 
must accept the French culture and way of life. However, research indicates that one gets the 
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“French” feeling only if one if born there (Bleich 2016). That indication means that immigrants 
and migrants could complete all the right steps to trying to become French and still not be 
successful in the endeavor. That dichotomy creates feelings of resentment among a whole group 
of people, which could undoubtedly result in violence.  
France has dealt with terrorism for a lot of its recent history, thus, there has been 
consequent legislation enacted. Since 1973, France’s criminal code had terrorism outlawed and 
the policy was that the individual’s French nationality would be rescinded. In 1995, specific 
terrorism legislation was created to respond to the terrorism of the Parisian Metro system. After 
9/11, France “reinforced its justice enforcement measures,” to be better equipped to respond to 
terrorism (Euronews 2015). However, one of the most major pieces of legislation, Act 2006-64, 
was a response to the London Bombings in 2005.  
Act 2006-64 called for greater use of surveillance in public places and the surveillance of 
communications among its people. The French police were also instructed to use drastic 
measures (shooting, etc) at vehicles that did not stop and the individuals in the vehicles could be 
held for questioning. During a reform in 2008, French authorities could conduct identity checks 
on international trains after they travelled 20 kilometers through the border (Euronews 2015). 
Additionally, this law allows for the French government to request Internet website owners to 
remove any content that could incite violence. In 2012, France created Act 2012-1432, which 
stipulates that punishment will be increased for anyone who conducts terrorism via the Internet. 
It also allows France to punish its’ citizens who commit terrorism in another country (France 
Diplomatie 2016). Despite France’s policy history, there were still responses to be had. 
One of the most concrete responses to the attack occurred when France bombed major 
ISIS strongholds within Syria, just two days after the Paris Attacks. This is significant because, 
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although France was bombing the area before the attacks, they only bombed within Syria around 
half a dozen times, making this massive attack truly significant (Rubin et al 2015). An additional 
policy response is that France’s State of Emergency lasted from November 2015 to May 2016. 
This state of emergency allowed for the police to put individuals under house arrest and conduct 
raids without judicial authorization, where they can seize personal data. The State of Emergency 
also allows French officials to disband demonstrations and restricting vehicular movement 
whenever it is deemed necessary by officials (Breeden 2016). In September 2016, a bill was 
passed in the French parliament’s lower house to amend the constitution to give state of 
emergency declaration procedures (Deutsche Welle 2016). However, human rights advocates in 
France question the law and say that it will give the policing force too much power that usurps 
the legal system of France.  
Analysis 
The unifying factor of all of these cases is that Islamic extremists conducted the attacks. 
In all, some of these cases had similarities, while some cases basically stood on their own. In 
researching this topic, there were some countries that had legislative information readily 
available, while others had very limited information available, especially that in English. The 
most significant item of clarification is that for the purpose of this study, what is most important 
is that there was an action taken by the government responding to the attack. That is considered 
to be a policy response, whether that action is policy, bureaucratic, monetary, implementation, 
etc.  
The following table describes the type of policy responses states utilized after they 
experienced a large-scale attack. It is significant to note that the greatest evidence of policy 
convergence appears in the attacks that occurred closer to 9/11, as more states created more 
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policy responses the closer they were to 9/11. This aspect is important for many reasons. 
Specifically, it demonstrates the effect of 9/11. More generally, the multitude of policy responses 
signifies that governments were willing to try multiple strategies to try and combat international 
terrorism. As time goes on, the policy responses are more focused on a specific type of response, 
such as in the case of London. The Mumbai attacks did not have any policy responses, so their 
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Within this case study, there is the issue of figuring out how to weigh the evidence. 
Having to evaluate whether legislation, bureaucratic response, criminal code/ police force 
enhancement, or military response is better than another response becomes difficult because each 
response is extremely different by their very nature. Therefore, it seemed like the best option to 
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evaluate the amount of times responses occurred and then evaluate the time frame in which more 
response occurred. Bureaucratic responses were the most popular response to a large-scale 
attack. This is most likely because bureaucratic responses often do not require legislation created 
by legislators. However, three cases did have formal legislation created after the large-scale 
attack, signifying that the issue of terrorism was important to legislators at the time. The least 
popular response was military action. This was most expected because terrorism organizations 
are not necessarily entire countries. It is difficult for a sovereign state to attack just a small 
portion of an additional sovereign state, thus, making military responses the least likely.  
In all of the cases, besides India there was evidence of some sort of policy convergence. 
All of the cases, except for France, had significant domestic terrorism before the large-scale 
terrorist attack occurred. The cases also have some sort of counterterrorism legislation associated 
with their instances of domestic terrorism. Each case study’s history of domestic terrorism had to 
do with separatist groups. Knowing that each state with domestic terrorism involved groups that 
wanted more autonomy from their country creates better understanding of the political culture of 
each examined case.  
It is also significant to point out that each case, with the exception of the Bali attack, had 
a response to the United State’s 9/11 attacks. Some of these responses were primarily 
bureaucratic, some diplomatic, and most were domestic legislation. It is necessary to point out 
that each country may not have had simply one response to 9/11; the instances that were most 
prominent through research were the responses noted. Each country creating a policy response to 
9/11 indicates that the events of 9/11 left an impact across the globe, paving the way for Policy 
Convergence Theory to take hold. This phenomena can also be noted by the passing of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373, as mentioned earlier.  
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Each attack was due to the responsibility of Islamic extremism. This fact demonstrates 
that the intention behind the attack was meant to be similar. Some of the attacks were of the 
responsibility of Al Qaeda and ISIS, where other attacks were from radical Islamists closer to 
each country by geographical location. The various groups indicate that radicalization of Islam 
occurs all over the world, and it demonstrates that there is a common issue across the globe, 
which allows Policy Convergence Theory to provide an explanation.  
Policy Convergence Theory is a path-dependent theory; states need to be on a similar 
economic track, face similar issues, and come to similar conclusions on how to fix those issues. 
The path associated with this particular study is that each state starts with domestic terrorism 
within their borders and the states pass associated policy responses for the domestic terrorism. 
Then, 9/11 occurs in the United States and the states in the case studies respond to 9/11. Then, all 
cases experience a large-scale attack, and states respond to that attack. Each case experienced a 
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This path is generalized above, however, it can be broken down into an individualized 
form. The individualized nature of the next chart allows the reader to visualize a general path, 
applied to each case. However, each case does not fit perfectly into the path. Most notably, the 
2015 Paris Attacks and the 2008 Mumbai Attacks are the examples that do not follow the 
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 The grey areas show where the path was disrupted. The only time I feel the path 
disruption is significant is when there was no response to the large-scale attack, so the most right 
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column. Out of all the cases, the only case to be excluded is the 2008 Mumbai Attacks because 
there was no policy response after the attack occurred. There were some interesting findings 
when evaluating the path that do not necessitate exclusions to their legitimacy. The 2002 Bali 
Bombing should not be excluded all together simply because they did not have a direct response 
to the 9/11 attacks. The 2002 Bali attacks transpired soon after 9/11, so expecting Bali to respond 
to 9/11 before their own attack seemed far-fetched. Lastly, the 2015 Paris Attacks should still be 
considered, despite their lack of domestic terrorism because France’s social policies could create 
levels of tension similar to domestic terrorism. However, the policy of the French government 
cannot and should not be considered domestic terrorism, despite the effects their policies may or 
may not have on the state.  
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that Policy Convergence Theory can be applied to the cases studies 
of Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and France because these cases had a 
response to a large-scale terrorist attack. Policy Convergence Theory is not supported by the case 
of India because they did not have a specific response to their large-scale attack. The evidence of 
policy convergence lies in the fact that all the policies targeted the individual rights of the 
population, each state had a significant amount of domestic terrorism present before the events of 
September 11th, and the convergence of all the policies created occurred within a similar time 
frame. With these three cases, policy convergence theory is applicable in foreign policy and 
exists in the topic of counterterrorism policy after the events of September 11th, 2001. 
The evidence suggests that these cases, excluding India, have travelled a similar path in 
terms of their responses to terrorism. This is significant because all three of these countries vary 
considerably in terms of culture and government. The fact that these countries have many 
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differences and yet still created similar policy responses to terrorism may demonstrate that 
counterterrorism policy does not have too many quality, responsible responses to combat 
terrorism. It may also demonstrate that maybe governments jump to radical policies in times of 
distress, for various reasons.  
There can be many repercussions to countries drafting similar policies. This research is 
important to security policy because it is significant to the international system when countries 
start acting in a similar fashion. It is especially significant when country’s start acting in a similar 
fashion, when no formal treaties on a specific topic have been created, other than the freezing of 
terrorist financing, as stated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. It is worth noting that 
all of these cases were faced with radical Islamic terrorism as the responsible party, thus 
motivating the response. This potentially unintentional collaboration of policy could help aid the 
international community combat terrorism. 
However, it is possible that a similar policy response across countries is exactly what 
terrorist groups desire, especially if those policies grow to be radical against a certain segment of 
a state’s population. In the case studies, the policy outputs target the individual rights of people. 
These policies may alienate honest people and potentially motivate them to consider supporting a 
terrorist group. It will be important for political scientists to evaluate whether or not similar 
counterterrorism policies benefit the international community or harm it. However, the benefits 
of information sharing and best practices could out weigh the potential negatives of Policy 
Convergence Theory. In all, the potential convergence of counterterrorism policy could be an 
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